“There Is No Pain, You Are Misreading”: Is God “Comfortably Numb”? Part 3

Posted by deangonzales on February 9, 2009

When God saw the proliferation of human sin and misery on the earth (Gen. 6:5, cf. 11-12), he “was grieved that he had made man on the earth, and his heart was filled with pain” (Gen. 6:6, NIV). One commentator doesn’t miss the vital importance of this inspired disclosure:

From the first Fall sin had grown like an avalanche; here at a special climax the narrator pauses and interrupts the regular progress of the account. He takes us from the world of complete disorderliness to God and dares to look into God’s grieving heart…. In daring contrast to what is said about the human heart there follows a word about what takes place in God’s heart: grief, affliction, and disappointment in man. Precisely in this way, by reference to the Creator’s bewilderment, he has communicated something of the incomprehensibility of this incursion of sin.”¹

As noted in our two previous posts, there exists a difference of opinion among commentators and theologians whether we should take such emotional responses ascribed to God literally. In Part 1 of our study, we observed that many Bible scholars resist a more literally reading of emotivity ascribed to God. One reason that gives these scholars pause is the fact that emotions as experienced by humans often include a physiological dimension. Sweaty palms, flushed face, rapid heartbeat, goose bumps and other like physical phenomena frequently accompany human emotivity. Since God is an incorporeal Spirit (Rom. 1:20; Col. 1:15; 1 Tim. 1:17), theologians have correctly rejected any physiological dimension to divine emotivity. This also may have been part of the reason why many theologians call emotional ascriptions to God “anthropopathisms” (i.e., human emotions ascribed to God that have a figurative not literal meaning) much like bodily ascriptions to God are called “anthropomorphisms” (i.e., human body parts ascribed to God that have a figurative not literal meaning).

But, as we’ve seen, many classical theologians that reject a more literal reading of divine emotivity are motivated by more than a concern to protect God’s incorporeal nature. After all, with the exception of strict materialists, everyone agrees that emotivity has a psychological as well as physical dimension. If so, why can’t God experience the psychological aspect without the physical? Enter the doctrines of divine transcendence, sovereignty and immutability. Emotions, affections, and passions are commonly understood as inward reactions and/or responses to outside stimuli.² These inward reactions and/or responses entail psychological changes. Since, according to Scripture, God is unchangeable or immutable (Num. 23:19; 1 Sam. 15:29; Ps. 102:27; Mal. 3:6; James 1:16-18; Heb. 1:12; 13:8), how can we attribute psychological “changes” to an unchangeable Being?

Moreover, the outside stimuli to which you and I respond (i.e., circumstances or events that normally provoke emotive responses) are often beyond our control. We have little or no control over the premature death of a family member that brings grief, the deceitful politician who provokes anger, or the surprise birthday party that prompts joy and gratitude. And some outward circumstances, which confront us, are so surprising and overwhelming that we have trouble controlling the emotional responses themselves. Many of us can recall the sibling or friend hiding behind the door whose “surprise” appearance and exclaimed “boo” sent us emotionally (not literally) “through the ceiling.” Almighty God, however, stands transcendently above time and space (Gen. 1:1; Pss. 90:2; Isa. 40:25-28; 57:15; John 1:1; Acts 17:24-28; Rom. 1:20; 16:26; Col. 1:16-17; 1 Tim. 1:17; 2 Pet. 3:8). Furthermore, he is absolutely sovereign. He’s planned every event that has or ever will come to pass within the matrix of human history. He actively controls every event and circumstance so that nothing can take him unawares or by surprise (Gen. 50:20; Job 23:13-14; Ps. 135:6; Prov. 16:33; Isa. 46:9-10; Dan. 4:34-35; Acts 4:27-28; Rom. 8:28-29; 9:19-20; Eph. 1:11). Since God is the supreme ruler and governor over all things, how can we attribute psychological “reactions” and “responses” that would make him seemingly the “pawn” of outward circumstance and, therefore, vulnerable?

I suspect it was this latter concern—a concern to protect God’s transcendence, sovereignty, and immutability—that primarily has driven some classic theologians to reject, minimize, or redefine divine emotivity. The concern to guard God’s incorporeality was secondary.³ This suspicion is supported by the fact that the primary heresies to which classic theists have responded on the question of divine emotivity have affirmed the incorporeality of God but have tended to reject (in part or entirely) God’s absolute transcendence, sovereignty, and/or immutability. These would include Socinianism, Pantheism, Panentheism or Process Theology, and Open Theism. None of these views attribute to God a literally body like that of man’s (though Pantheism and Panentheism closely identify God with the material universe). They all, however, to one degree or another, challenge God’s absolute transcendence, sovereignty and/or immutability. They have no hesitation, therefore, conceiving of God as less than omnipotent and omniscient. He is, therefore, not absolutely sovereign over all events in creation. Accordingly, he is subject to external stimuli and genuine change. For example, Clark Pinnock, an Open Theist, doesn’t hesitate to assert, “God does not control everything that happens. Rather, he is open to receiving input from his creatures. In loving dialogue, God invites us to participate with him to bring the future into being.”⁴ This line of reasoning, not surprisingly, exploits the biblical data on divine emotivity. “God is not cool and collected,” avers Pinnock, “but is deeply involved and can be wounded.”⁵ Indeed, this capacity to feel sorrow and pain makes God genuinely “vulnerable.”⁶

When one considers the clear biblical affirmations of God’s incorporeality, transcendence, sovereignty, and immutability, together with the ancient and modern challenges to these doctrines, he can understand why a number of classic theists and Reformed theologians have felt constrained to dissuade the reader from interpreting divine emotivity too literally. After all, responses to external stimuli that entail psychological changes would seem to conflict with the biblical portrait of a sovereign God who has decreed the end from the beginning and who does not change. It has seemed preferable to some, therefore, to interpose a great deal of dissimilarity between the referent we normally associate with emotional attributes and the referent to which such emotive attributions actually point when predicated of God. As a result, what you and I normally think of as emotions turn out to be quite different when applied to God. They refer, metaphorically, to divine actions (redemptive or punitive), which, in turn, spring from unchanging ethical virtues within the Godhead.

Is this classical interpretation of divine emotivity, which some Reformed theologians advance, fully biblical? Should we interpret God’s heart-piercing grief over the explosion of human sin and misery in Genesis 6:6 as a mere metaphorical expression that points proleptically to his enactment of the judgment portrayed in the subsequent context (6:7ff.)? As I demonstrated in Part 2 of this series, a number of Reformed theologians have not been persuaded by the classical treatment of divine emotivity and would, presumably, answer these questions in the negative. They insist that God has genuine feelings. I’m inclined to agree with this latter group of theologians. Here are my reasons:

1.    The God Who Feels

I believe the Bible provides an overwhelming amount of data in favor of divine emotivity.⁷ God is said to feel such affections as love⁸ and hate,⁹ joy¹⁰ and grief,¹¹ pleasure¹² and anger,¹³ and peace.¹⁴ And this list is by no means exhaustive. Of course, the Scriptures also attribute human body parts to God, such as eyes,¹⁵ arms,¹⁶ hands,¹⁷ a mouth,¹⁸ etc. Obviously, God’s incorporeal nature constrains us to interpret the latter metaphorically, as “anthropomorphisms.” So, it has been argued, we must interpret God’s emotions in like fashion, as “anthropopathisms.”

However, as we noted above, emotivity has a psychological as well as physical dimension. This is true of mental activity as well. When humans think, there is both a psychological as well as physical dimension involved. Yet, very few theologians interpret cognitive activities ascribed to God metaphorically, as mere “anthroponouisms.” In fact, it can be argued that the essence of thinking, feeling, and choosing is not primarily physical but spiritual in nature.¹⁹ After all, may we not safely assume that the disembodied souls of righteous men in heaven presently experience joy, pleasure, and peace while the disembodied spirits of the ungodly experience sorrow, pain, and torment?²⁰ What is more, the Bible ascribes emotional experience to angels, which are spiritual beings (Job 38:7; Pss. 103:20; 148:2; Rev. 5:11-14). It follows, then, that corporeality is not an essential feature of genuine emotivity. Hence, the obvious disjunction between human body parts (which are material) and divine “body parts” (which are metaphorical) does not equally apply to human and divine emotivity.

These considerations should prompt us to reconsider the way we think of so-called “anthropomorphisms” and “anthropopathisms.” Traditionally, Bible interpreters have reserved these expressions for some language about God. But since all special revelation comes to us via human language, then all special revelation is, in one sense, “anthropomorphic.”²¹ Furthermore, since the heavens declare the glory of God (Ps. 19:1; Rom. 1:19-20), then we may speak of general revelation as, in a sense, “anthropopomorphic” or, more generally, “cosmomorphic.”²² Of course, this line of reasoning corresponds nicely with man’s identity as “the image of God” (Gen. 1:26-27). As such, human beings are analogues of God. More precisely, we are visible replicas and representatives of the invisible God. Hence, we might even reverse the tables and refer to humans as “theomorphs” and human language as “theomorphic”²³ Consequently, there is a reciprocal interplay between our knowledge of God and our knowledge of ourselves (and the world around us). This is the note on which Calvin begins his famous Institutes:

Nearly all the wisdom we possess, that is to say, true and sound wisdom, consists in two parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves. But, while joined by many bonds, which one precedes and brings forth the other is not easy to discern. In the first place, no one can look upon himself without immediately turning his thoughts to the contemplation of God, in whom he ‘lives and moves.’ For, quite clearly, the mighty gifts with which we are endowed are hardly from ourselves…. Then, by these benefits shed like dew from heaven upon us, we are led as by rivulets to the spring itself…. Accordingly, the knowledge of ourselves not only arouses us to seek God, but also, as it were, leads us by the hand to find him.²⁴

Conversely, writes Calvin, “It is certain that man never achieves a clear knowledge of himself unless he has first looked upon God’s face, and then descends from contemplating him to scrutinize himself.”²⁵ Unfortunately, Calvin forgets his own counsel when it comes to interpreting divine emotivity. Instead of looking for analogy, Calvin stresses discontinuity. Hence, when interpreting God’s grief in Genesis 6:6, Calvin insists,

The repentance [“grief,” NIV], which is here ascribed to God, does not properly belong to him, but has reference to our understanding of him. For since we cannot comprehend him as he is, it is necessary that, for our sake, he should, in a certain sense, transform himself…. Certainly God is not sorrowful or sad; but remains for ever like himself in his celestial and happy repose: yet, because it could not otherwise be known how great is God’s hatred and detestation of sin, therefore the Spirit accommodates himself to our capacity.²⁶

Two logical inconsistencies appear in Calvin’s reasoning. First, he seems willing to allow God the emotions of anger and detestation (or does he mean for us to take these figuratively too?) but not the emotions of regret and sorrow. Second, he argues that God (through Moses) uses descriptive language that, on the one hand, is not properly true of himself in order to, on the other hand, make known to us what “could not otherwise be known.” Am I missing something?

Similarly, when commenting on Isaiah 63:9, which reads, “In all [Israel’s] affliction [God] was afflicted,” Calvin remarks,

In order to move us more powerfully and draw us to himself, the Lord accommodates himself to the manner of men, by attributing to himself all the affection, love, and (sumpatheia) compassion which a father can have. And yet in human affairs it is impossible to conceive of any sort of kindness or benevolence which he does not immeasurably surpass.

So far so good. But then Calvin adds his anthropopathic qualifier: “not that [God] can in any way endure anguish, but, by a very customary figure of speech, he assumes and applies to himself human passions.”²⁷ Of course, it’s true that divine emotivity is not univocal with human emotivity (any more than divine knowledge is univocal with human knowledge). Hence, one may speak of a degree of “accommodation” when applying language used to predicate human emotions to God. Nevertheless, as the imago Dei, man is an analogue of God. Accordingly, divine emotivity is the Archetype of human emotivity, which is the ectype. We are, therefore, compelled to agree with Donald Carson when he writes,

It is no answer to espouse a form of impassibility that denies that God has an emotional life and insists all of the biblical evidence to the contrary is nothing more than anthropopathism. The price is too heavy. You may then rest in God’s sovereignty, but you can no longer rejoice in his love. You may rejoice only in a linguistic expression that is an accommodation of some reality of which we cannot conceive, couched in the anthropopathism of love. Give me a break. Paul did not pray that his readers might be able to grasp the height and depth and length and breadth of an anthropopathism and know this anthropopathism that surpasses knowledge (Eph. 3:14-21).²⁸

In sum, we should not interpret God’s grief in Genesis 6:6 merely as a figure of speech that points to outward acts (i.e., judgment) rather than to an inward feelings (as it normally does vis-à-vis humans). After all, God has plenty of human words at his disposal to refer to judgment literally. Indeed, God employs such literal terminology in the subsequent context when he portends a worldwide flood (6:7ff.). So if God can use plain language to depict his imminent intervention in judgment, why employ a figurative expression that might lead the reader to the “mistaken” notion that the Almighty might have something analogous to human feelings?

Need I say more? God through Moses discloses to us that the escalation of human hubris and the misery that followed in its trail prompted him to grieve. Of course, his grief was not accompanied with literal tears or heaving breast. Nor was it tainted with sin, as post-lapsarian human grief often is. But it was grief nevertheless. Accordingly, Victor Hamilton is correct when he observes, “Verses like this remind us that the God of the OT is not beyond the capability of feeling pain, chagrin, and remorse. To call him the Impassible Absolute is but part of the truth.”²⁹

2.    Impassible & Passible

But doesn’t the conclusion reached above contradict what the Bible teaches regarding God’s transcendence, sovereignty, and immutability? If God is above time and space, if he’s decreed and determines the end from the beginning, if he’s immutably happy in his “celestial repose,” how can we conceive of him as being moved to respond with sorrow by something outside himself (i.e., human sin and misery)? In other words, if we interpret God’s emotions as genuine inward responses to outward stimuli, won’t we compromise the doctrine of God’s impassibility?

The simple answer is “no.” Ultimately, God has determined the end from the beginning. He ordained the Fall (Gen. 3:1-6) and the proliferation of human sin (Gen. 6:5). He ordained his outward redemptive/punitive response to human sin (6:7ff.) But he also ordained his inward emotional response to human sin (6:6). In that sense, we may speak of God as “impassible.” Nothing takes God by surprise. On the other hand, God manifests his covenant presence within the matrix of human history. He not only exists outside of time and space, but he has chosen to manifest his presence within time and space. And within the matrix of human history, God responds or, if I may use the term without being misunderstood, he is “moved” by human events. In this (guarded) sense, we may speak of God as “passible.” Samuel Waldron, Academic Dean and Professor of Systematic Theology at Midwest Center for Theological Studies, agrees. “We must,” argues Waldron, “augment the doctrine of impassibility with a clear doctrine of divine relationality.” That is,

We must, I think, clearly affirm that God is both impassible and passible. As the God who was free not to create, as the God who has decreed whatsoever comes to pass, as the God who has no needs not satisfied by his own fullness, He is and must be immutable and impassible. He is (always has been and will be) serene in the blessedness of the inter-Trinitarian fellowship of persons and in the execution of His immutable and comprehensive decree.

Yet by His free act of creation God has chosen to subject Himself to the influences of His creatures. Of course, He has done this without giving up His position as the Creator and Sovereign of the universe who in Himself is immutably serene, has no need-based emotions, and who is immutable in His comprehensive purpose. Thus, He is only passible in exactly those ways and for exactly those purposes that He has freely chosen in His decree and in no other way. The fact, however, that He has chosen to be passible and passible in only those ways He has chosen does not devalue or deny the fact of His passibility. It simply means His passibility is limited and has to do with His purposes in the world—His free decision to glorify His name in the world. It also means that it coexists with an infinite and transcendent impassibility in God considered in Himself eternally.³⁰

John Frame, Professor of Apologetics and Systematic Theology at Reformed Theological Seminary, speaks in a similar fashion:

Although God’s eternal decree does not change, it does ordain change. It ordains a historical series of events, each of which receives God’s evaluation. God evaluates different events in different ways. Those evaluations themselves are fixed in God’s eternal plan. But they are genuine evaluations of the events. It is not wrong to describe them as responses to these events.³¹

In the words of J. Oliver Buswell, “Does ever a sinner repent, there is always joy in the presence of the angels (Luke 15:7, 10). Does ever a child of God, ’sealed’ by the Spirit, fall into sin, the Holy Spirit is ‘grieved’ (Eph. 4:30).”³² In other words, God really responds emotively to events that transpire within creation and redemption history. One might say that God is “impassible” from the perspective of his transcendence and “passible” from the perspective of his immanence.

I’ve tried to think of a good illustration. Imagine God as the cosmic movie scriptwriter, producer, and director. God’s also chosen, like many modern directors, to participate in the story as one of the main actors. Indeed, he’s given himself the leading role. He’s created a magnificent epic. It’s full of tragedy. But it has a happy ending. As the scriptwriter, producer, and director, God takes pride in his work and enjoys it with a sense of peace, calm, and gratification, knowing the plot has a glorious ending. But as God actively participates in the various stages of the plot in the capacity of actor, he weeps at misfortune, grows angry at injustice, and rejoices in the triumph of good. Granted, this illustration fails to capture the full complexity of God’s heart. But I believe we must embrace all the biblical descriptions of God (those emphasizing his transcendence as well as those emphasizing his immanence) even if we can’t fully conceptualize their relations.

So I affirm that God is self-contained, independent, and wholly satisfied with himself. He possesses a kind of joy that cannot be marred. Yet, I also affirm that within the matrix of human history God experiences grief, sorrow, anger, pleasure, love, hatred, jealousy, joy and peace. All of these emotional responses are perfectly consistent with his unchanging “being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.”³³

3.    Is this Consistent with the Confession of Faith?

The framers of the Westminster Confession of Faith, the Savoy Declaration, and the Second London Baptist Confession assert that God is “a most pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions [emphasis added]” (II, 1). Does the affirmation of divine emotivity (above) require us to reject the Confession’s teaching that God is “without … passions”? Some scholars believe so.³⁴ But I’m not convinced we need disagree with our forefathers. We may, however, need to clarify or augment their teaching.

I have a facsimile copy of the 1689 (actually, 1677) Baptist Confession of Faith. There’s no proof text given. I don’t have a facsimile edition of the Westminster Confession. But in the edition I do have,³⁵ as well as later editions of the Baptist Confession, Acts 14:11, 15 is given as a proof text. In that passage, Paul and Barnabas dissuade the crowds in Lystra from venerating them as “gods” (v. 11) since they were mere mortals, that is, men of “like passions” (v. 15, KJV). Most modern translations render it “the same [like] nature” (NKJ, NAS, ESV, CSB; NET) or “human like you” (NIV). At best, the text teaches that humans have human passions and, by way of inference, that deity does not have human passions. So the framers of our Confession were probably thinking of the physiological dimension of human emotion, which, of course, could not be predicated of God. This would fit the context since the term “passions” is immediate preceded by the words “body” and “parts.” Perhaps adding the term “human” before “body, parts, or passions” would help to clarify the intent of the Confession and prevent modern Reformed Christians from arriving at the unbiblical conclusion that God does not experience what are analogous to human emotions.

On the other hand, I’m not convinced that the framers of the confessions (WCF, Savoy, LBCF) were uninfluenced by philosophical notions related to divine impassibility. It is possible, therefore, that their doctrinal formula, viz., that God is “without … passions,” reflects an attempt to protect God’s transcendence, sovereignty, and immutability by means of precluding any genuine emotivity as a proper predicate of God. If so, then we may laud their zeal to protect God’s transcendence and agree that God is the ultimate cause behind every event in human history, including his own responses to sin (inwardly and outwardly). Hence, God is not passive. He is, in this sense, impassible. But affirming God’s impassibility vis-à-vis his transcendence, sovereignty, and immutability is only one part of the truth. God, as we have seen, is also covenantally present within the matrix of human history. Consequently, it may be appropriate at some point, for the sake of removing ambiguity and enhancing clarity, to augment the Confession’s excellent summary of God’s nature with an affirmation of his relationality toward the work of his hands not only outwardly (via the works of creation and providence [redemptive/punitive]) but inwardly (via emotive responses). Somehow, we, as Reformed Christians, need to make it plain to the world and to the church that the God we worship and serve is a God who genuinely feels.

Dr. Bob Gonzales, Dean
Reformed Baptist Seminary

1. Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary, 2nd ed., trans. John H. Marks (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1961), 117. [↩]
2. Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1998) defines “emotion” as “A moving of the mind or soul; excitement of the feelings, whether pleasing or painful; disturbance or agitation of mind caused by a specific exciting cause and manifested by some sensible effect on the body.” Some definitions assume a strict dichotomy between the mind, will, and emotions. For example, one dictionary defines “emotion” as “an affective state of consciousness in which joy, sorrow, fear, hate, or the like, is experienced, as distinguished from cognitive and volitional states of consciousness” (Dictionary.com Unabridged based on the Random House Dictionary, 2006). However, Jonathan Edwards does a fine job of demonstrating the connection between emotions (or “affections” as he calls them) and the will. A Treatise on Religious Affections (1746; reprint, Banner of Truth, 1961), 24-27. Moreover, John Frame shows the connection between the mind and the emotions–emotive responses being intertwined with cognitive evaluations of events or states of affairs. The Doctrine of God (Presbyterian & Reformed, 2002), 509-12, 528-29, 608-11. Recently, Matthew Elliott has published a monograph entitled Faithful Feelings: Rethinking Emotion in the New Testament (Kregel Academic, 2006) in which he demonstrates the cognitive element of emotions from the Scriptures. In any case, emotions are undoubtedly responses or reactions that entail psychological changes in the way one feels. [↩]
3. It may be the classic theism’s apparent concern to guard the incorporeal nature of God was influenced not merely by Scripture but by Greek philosophy (see Part 1). The latter tended to have a negative view of emotions altogether. The former certainly does not. [↩]
4. The Openness of God, ed. Clark H. Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker, and David Basinger (Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity Press, 1994), 7. [↩]
5. Ibid., 118. [↩]
6. “An Interview with Clark Pinnock,” Modern Reformation (Nov-Dec, 1998), 37. [↩]
7. Greg Nichols provides a helpful overview, collation, and exposition of the biblical data related to God’s emotions in his article, “The Emotivity of God,” The Reformed Baptist Theological Review 1:2 (July 2004): 95-143. The verses below related to divine emotivity are drawn from Nichols’ survey. [↩]
8. Deut. 7:13; 10:15; Ps. 18:19; Prov. 11:1; 12:22; 15:8; Isa. 42:1; 61:8; Jer. 9:24; John 17:24. [↩]
9. Pss. 5:5; 11:5; Prov. 6:16; Isa. 1:14; 61:8. [↩]
10. Deut. 28:63; 30:9; Jdg. 9:13; Neh. 8:10; Pss. 16:11; 60:6; 104:31; Isa. 62:5; 65:19; Jer. 32:41; Zeph. 3:17; Luke 15:7, 10; John 15:11; 17:13. [↩]
11. Gen. 6:6; Jdg. 10:16; Pss. 78:40; 95:10; Isa. 63:10; Eph. 4:30; Heb. 3:10, 17. [↩]
12. Num. 23:27; 24:1; 1 Kings 3:10; Pss. 69:3; 149:4; Prov. 16:7; Eccl. 7:26; Ezra 10:11; Rom. 8:8; Phil. 4:18; Col. 3:20; 1 Thess. 4:1; Heb. 11:5, 6; 13:16, 21. [↩]
13. Num. 11:10; 22:22; Deut. 4:25; 6:15; 7:4; 9:18, 19: 13:17; 29:20; Josh. 7:1; Jdg. 2:12, 14, 20; 3:8; 10:7; Pss. 2:12; 7:11; 78:49; 85:3; 90:11; 103:8; 145:8; Jer. 4:8; Rom. 1:18; 2:5, 9; 9:22; 12:19; Eph. 2:3; 5:6; Col. 3:6; 1 Thess. 1:10; 2:16; 5:9; Heb. 3:11; Rev. 6:16, 17; 14:10, 19; 15:1, 7; 16:1, 19; 19:15. [↩]
14. Ps. 23:4; John 14:27; Rom. 15:33; Phil. 4:7, 9; 1 Thess. 5:23; 2 Thess. 3:16; Heb. 13:20. [↩]
15. Gen. 6:8; Deut. 11:12; 2 Sam. 7:19; 15:29; 1 Kings 15:5; 2 Kings 12:2; 14:3; 15:3, 34; 16:2; 18:3; 19:16; 2 Chron. 17:17; 14:2; 16:9; 24:2; 25:2; 26:4; 27:2; 28:1; 29:2; 34:2; Pss. 11:4; 34:15; Prov. 5:21; 15:3; 22:12; Isa. 37:13; Jer. 5:3; Amos 9:8; Zech. 4:10; 1 Pet. 3:12. [↩]
16. Pss. 44:3; 89:10, 13; Isa. 40:10-11; 51:5, 9; 52:10; 53:1; 62:8; John 12:38. [↩]
17. 1 Sam. 15:11; 2 Chron. 20:12; Job 19:21; 27:11; Eccl. 2:24; 9:1; Mark 16:19; Acts 2:23; 7:55, 56; Rom. 8:34; Col. 3:1; Heb. 10:12; 1 Pet. 3:22; 5:6. [↩]
18. Deut. 8:3; Jos. 17:4; 2 Chron. 35:22; 36:12; Isa. 1:20; 34:16; 40:5; 58:14; 62:2; Jer. 9:12; 23:16; Micah 4:4; Matt. 4:4. [↩]
19. Both Charles Hodge and John Gill affirm that the capacity to think, will, and feel belong properly to the nature of spiritual creatures. Hodge, Systematic Theology (Reprint, Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1986), 1:378, 79, 80; Gill, A Complete Body of Doctrinal and Practical Divinity (London: Thomas Tegg, 1839), 1:51. Unfortunately, Gill, unlike Hodge, denies that affections “properly” belong to God (1:146). [↩]
20. One need only think of the prospect of emotional happiness that awaited the thief on the cross in Paradise (Luke ) or the apostle Paul when he would be “absent from the body” (Phil. 1:21, 23; 2 Tim. 4:7-8). [↩]
21. See Vern Poythress, God-Centered Biblical Interpretation (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1999), 32-36. [↩]
22. James Jordan, Through New Eyes: Developing a Biblical View of the World (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1988), 19-26; idem, Creation in Six Days: A Defense of the Traditional Reading of Genesis One (Moscow, ID: Canon Press, ), 105-11; John Frame, The Doctrine of God, 366-68. [↩]
23. Moisés Silva makes this point in God, Language, and Scripture, vol. 3 in Foundations of Contemporary Interpretation, ed. Moisés Silva (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 206.d [↩]
24. Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, ed. John T. McNeill (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960), 1:35-36 [Book I, 1.1]. [↩]
25. Ibid., 1:37 [Book I, 1.2] [↩]
26. Commentaries on the First Book of Moses Called Genesis, trans. John King (Reprint, Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2003), 1:248-49. [↩]
27. Commentary on Isaiah, trans. William Pringle (Reprint, Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2003), 3:346-37. See also his commentaries on Deuteronomy 5:29; 32:29; Psalm 81:13; Lamentations 3:33; and Hosea 11:8. [↩]
28. The Difficult Doctrine of God’s Love (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2000), 58-59. [↩]
29. The Book of Genesis: Chapters 1-17, NICOT, ed. Robert L. Hubbard Jr. (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1990), 274. [↩]
30. Samuel Waldron, “‘Without Body, Parts, or Passions’: A Contemporary Defense of Divine Impassibility,” an unpublished paper, pp. 15-16; cited with the author’s permission. [↩]
31. The Doctrine of God, 610. [↩]
32. A Systematic Theology of the Christian Religion (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962), 1:57. [↩]
33. The phrase is taken from the Westminster Shorter Catechism Q/A #4. [↩]
34. In his defense of divine emotivity, Wayne Grudem thinks it necessary to reject the doctrine of impassibility. Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 65-66. In my opinion, this move is unnecessary. [↩]
35. I’m using the edition printed in Philip Schaff’s The Creeds of Christendom, 6th edition (Reprint, Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1990), 3:598ff. [↩]

9 Responses to ““There Is No Pain, You Are Misreading”: Is God “Comfortably Numb”? Part 3”

1. Jim Roach Says:
   February 9th, 2009 at 9:24 pm

   How can we interpret the two verses in I John 4:8,16 which say, in part, “Anyone who does not love, does not know God; because God is love.” and “we have come to know and to believe the love that God has for us. God is love, and whoever abides in love, abides in God, and God abides in him.” (ESV) If God’s Word has meaning, how can John write “…God is love…” but mean instead that He is not really love, but He appears to us as being love because we cannot know Him as He is? I guess it depends upon what “is” is.

2. deangonzales Says:
   February 10th, 2009 at 11:43 am

   Excellent point, Dr. Roach. The apostle John draws an explicit analogy between divine and human love, and he emphasizes their similarities rather than similarities. I certainly believe that the phrase “God is love” means more than “God does kind things for people but he feels nothing towards them.” According to Scripture, we are God’s workmanship (Eph. 2:10), and he works in us what is “well-pleasing” in his sight (Heb. 13:21). Hence, the Father feels affection towards those who love Jesus and keep his commandments (John 14:21, 23).

3. Keith Throop Says:
   February 13th, 2009 at 11:26 pm

   I have really enjoyed these articles. Thank so much for writing them.

   I was wondering as I read your description of God as “‘impassible’ from the perspective of his transcendence and ‘passible’ from the perspective of his immanence,” if there isn’t a similarity here with the doctrine of the will(s) of God, in which we distinguish between God’s decretive and prescriptive will. If so, then, since most Reformed folk already accept such a distinction with regard to the willing of God, then perhaps this will make it easier for them to embrace a similar distinction with regard to the feeling of God. Oh well, just thinking out loud a bit.

   Thanks again!

   Keith

4. deangonzales Says:
   February 14th, 2009 at 4:15 pm

   Keith,

   Thanks for your remarks. There is, I think, an analogy in viewing God’s will from two perspectives (I.e., decretive and preceptive) and viewing God’s relationship to the world and mankind from two perspectives (I.e., transcendence and immanence). These observations remind us of the importance of striving to incorporate the whole counsel of God when attempting to “draw” an accurate portrait of God.

5. “There Is No Pain, You Are Misreading”: Is God “Comfortably Numb”? Part 2 | RBS Tabletalk Says:
   February 16th, 2009 at 12:10 pm

   [...] of divine impassibility that preclude the attribution of genuine emotional responses to God. In the next part in our series, we’ll argue, with the help of others, that it’s possible to affirm God is both impassible [...]

6. Jeremiah Mattingly Says:
   February 16th, 2009 at 12:52 pm

   Dr. Gonzales,

   Great series. This has been very helpful for me to think through these issues, as we’ve recently been discussing related matters in our church.

   Is part of the difficulty in understanding this also due to the fact that God can apparently simultaneously feel a myriad of emotions, in a way that human cannot? Sure, I can sometimes feel a love and anger at the same time, but with all the events that God is “assessing” at any given point, and with all the individuals involved, God seems to be capable of feeling a multitude of emotions all at once.

   Jeremiah

7. deangonzales Says:
   February 16th, 2009 at 1:26 pm

   Jeremiah,

   Thanks for the encouragement. I’m glad the series has been helpful. Your point about the complexity of God’s heart (mind, will, and emotions) is well-taken. As a man, Jesus could experience fear, sorrow, and a healthy aversion to God’s wrath while simultaneously doing the Father’s will (by drinking the cup) with a deep-seated joy (Psa. 40:8) as well as a lively hope in future bliss (Heb. 12:2). So human nature is capable of “multi-tasking.” We can experience a number of emotions a different levels somewhat simultaneously. God, of course, is infinitely more complex. He is fully aware of a myriad of events that take place simultaneously throughout the universe. Accordingly, God is the Supreme “Multi-tasker.” And just as He is aware (mentally) of millions of events simultaneously, so He is able to assess those events emotively at the same time. Definitely, mind-blowing!

8. “There Is No Pain, You Are Misreading”: Is God “Comfortably Numb”? Part 1 | RBS Tabletalk Says:
   February 18th, 2009 at 6:28 pm

   [...] note some Reformed theologians who have affirmed that God responds emotively. Following that, in Part 3, we’ll attempt to demonstrate how one may affirm divine impassibility in a way that need not [...]

9. Does God Have Feelings? Twelve Theses on Divine Emotivity and Impassibility | RBS Tabletalk Says:
   June 3rd, 2009 at 12:16 pm

   [...] for I am grieved that I have made them [emphasis added]” (6:7, NIV). Bob G. [2] As I noted in Part 3, footnote 2, Jonathan Edwards argues, I think cogently, that emotions (or “affections” as he [...]

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