A Rejoinder to Nathanael Smith
Posted by deangonzales on July 14, 2008
2 Comments
Several weeks ago I contrasted Peter Enns’s approach to the inspiration of the OT with that of Jeffrey Niehaus, both of whom are OT scholars who engage in comparative studies with data from the ancient Near East. I assessed Enns overall negatively and Niehaus positively. See Peter Enns, Jeffrey Niehaus, the Ancient Near East, and Inspiration. Nathanael Smith, a student of philosophy, posted a negative critique of my assessment on his blog site, Profundus Ignarus: Theological and Philosophical Musings and Resources. To read his critique and my reply to his critique in the comment section at the end of his post click here. He in turn wrote an entirely new post entitled, “A Response to Dr. Robert Gonzales Jr.,” in which he correctly identifies my epistemic approach as presuppositional and labels his own as evidentialist. You will find his post here. Below I offer a rejoinder in response to his second post.
Nathanael,
I apologize for not responding to your post earlier. I’ve been incredibly busy. I’m sure you can identify with that. ? Nevertheless, I have a little free time now and will attempt to provide a brief response to some of the objections you raised vis-à-vis my epistemic framework.
First, you are correct to identify me as holding a basically presuppositional view of epistemology, though, like John Frame, I would hold a modified form.
Second, you take issue with the notion that one must begin with preconceptions of “reality.” Yet, as the first responder to your post points out, you seem to do that very thing. You “take it as a fact that there is in fact an external reality. Furthermore [you] say that the human sensory apparatus is trustworthy within reasonable limits.” You view these “presuppositions” as “foundational propositions” that are “at some level self-evident although arguable [sic] so.” I’m not sure what the added concessive clause means. Does “although arguably so” mean that you can provide proper warrant for such “foundational” and “self-evident” propositions? If so, you don’t seem to think such argumentation is necessary since, in your words, “the evidentialist position does not insist upon the evidential grounding of every proposition.” This allows you to hold a basic framework of interpreting the world without providing any epistemic justification. That seems like a convenient way to avoid the very circularity of which you accuse me.
Third, you “think the presuppositionalist takes a rather dim view of the ability of mankind to obtain knowledge about God through the use of reason and observation directed at God’s natural revelation.” You believe Romans 1:18-20 suggests otherwise. In response, I would point out that the presuppositionalist does in fact believe that all humans have been created with the noetic apparatus to perceive God through natural and special revelation. Indeed, according to Romans 1:18-21, all men do at some level “know” God. Moreover, the unbeliever knows what God requires of him (Rom. 1:32; 2:12-14). Yet, as Paul makes clear, the unbeliever “suppresses” the truth about God (v. 18). In another place he writes, “But the natural man does not welcome what comes from God’s Spirit, because it is foolishness to him; he is not able to know it since it is evaluated spiritually” (1 Cor. 2:14, CSB). Of course, the latter text is referring to special revelation, but I think the point is the same. Apart from a supernatural work of God’s grace the unregenerate man cannot obtain an epistemologically sound and ethically approved knowledge of God. In the words of Jesus, “No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him” (John 6:44).
Fourth, the problem of “conversion” you attribute to the presuppositionalist position is, I think, an unfair characterization. A presuppositionalist believes that men in general have the ontological equipment to know God properly. What is more, the presuppositionalist believes that the process of conversion includes the exercise of one’s mental and emotive faculties. Nevertheless, the presuppositionalist takes seriously Paul’s evaluation of the non-believer when he writes, “For the sinful nature is always hostile to God. It never did obey God’s laws, and it never will. That’s why those who are still under the control of their sinful nature can never please God” (Rom. 8:7-8, NLT). In other words, the natural man’s ethical aversion to God and his law prevents him from arriving at a true knowledge of God (John 17:3). He is like a bird with a broken wing. Ontologically, he can fly—he was created to fly. But ethically, the unregenerate man cannot “fly.” Consequently, God must, in the language of the prophet Ezekiel, replace the heart of stone with a heart of flesh (Ezek. 36). Once this “heart-change” or reorientation of the ethical and affectional proclivities has obtained, the individual will savingly embrace (freely employing his mind and will) what he already knew deep down (at some level) to be true. You seem to believe that one may escape a “naturalistic viewpoint” apart from a “supernatural work of God.” That may be so. But in such a case, escaping a naturalistic viewpoint would not be equivalent to becoming a Christian. For according to Jesus, one cannot become a true believer apart from a supernatural work of God (John 3:3, 5; 6:37, 44).
Fifth, by referring to different “realities” (e.g., an atheist’s, Mother Teresa’s, etc.), I was simply making the point that not everyone shares the same “foundational propositions” (to use your language) from which to assess truth claims or to interpret empirical data. The atheist does not see belief in God as properly basic. The Christian—at least the presuppositionalist—does. You seem to think all men begin life at ground zero epistemologically and ethically (tabula rasa). Presumably, they then begin to build a “reality” based on an unbiased sensory accumulation and mental interpretation of brute facts. I would differ. There are passages in Scripture that portray humankind as born sinners (Gen. 8:21; Psa. 51:5; 58:3; Rom. 3:10ff., 23; Eph. 2:1-3). I agree that general and special revelation does, at some level, “resonate” within the heart of every man. But the unbeliever does not, apart from God’s saving grace, properly respond to that revelation. In the words of Cornelius Van Til, “The most depraved of men cannot wholly escape the voice of God. Their greatest wickedness is meaningless except upon the assumption that they have sinned against the authority of God …. The natural man accuses or else excuses himself only because his own utterly depraved consciousness continues to point back to the original natural state of affairs. The prodigal son can never forget the father’s voice. It is the albatross forever about his neck” (“Nature and Scripture,” The Infallible Word, 2nd ed. [Phillipsburg: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1967], 274-75).
Sixth, by “pre-programming,” I did not mean to say that everyone is born with a complete (let alone correct) knowledge of God. Rather, to use an analogy, humans have been created with a pre-formatted hard drive, so to speak (compare Noam Chomsky’s theory of an innate proclivity to grammatical structure). That pre-formatted drive is configured to receive and process divine revelation in a certain way. Because the natural man is born with an aversion toward God (Rom. 8:7-8), he attempts to process divine revelation in a way that is inconsistent and incompatible with his “hard drive.” Hence, he cannot quite make sense of life. His epistemology oscillates between rationalism and irrationalism. To use another analogy, processing the raw stuff of God’s universe into a reality like that of an atheist, an agnostic, a Buddhist, Muslim, etc., is like trying to squeeze all the wrong feet into Cinderella’s slipper. They just don’t fit. But the self-authenticating gospel presented in Scripture (i.e., Cinderella’s foot) does fit. It alone resonates within the human heart as true and authoritative.
Seventh, you don’t believe you’re faced with the problem of infinite regress or epistemic circularity as an evidentialist. Jesus’ claims to be Messiah and Savior of the world are grounded in his actions and miracles. But are the actions and miracles of Christ recorded in Scripture self-interpreting? For example, Jesus foretold his resurrection and, according to the Scripture writers, many witnesses confirmed it. But what is the significance of such an event? How does a resurrection or walking on the water or healing a blind person ipso facto authenticate his claims to be the Son of God? Isn’t that the interpretation placed upon these events by Christ and his followers? Upon what epistemic or ethical grounds are we bound to accept their interpretation of the facts? I don’t think the evidentialist has a good answer to these questions. Indeed, Jesus himself teaches that miracles alone are not sufficient to change an unbeliever’s disposition towards the Scripture (Luke 16:27-31). The presuppositionalist, on the other hand, argues that we must believe Christ’s claims and believe that his miracles validate his claims on the basis of divine revelation. What epistemic and ethical authority could be higher than God?
Finally, I prefer to view properly basic or presuppositional commitments as an epistemic spiral rather than an epistemic circle. Hence, I engage the evidence. With a bias? Yes. Actually, a hierarchy of biases. The most foundational are those most resistant to modification. The less foundational are, of course, more susceptible to modification and change. Nevertheless, my epistemic spiral doesn’t preclude the evidence from adjusting or modifying my biases. Admittedly, it would take quite a lot of evidence to dissuade me from my belief in the God of the Bible. Indeed, I don’t believe I could make sense out of the world apart from the Christian worldview as revealed in Scripture. In my view, the self-authenticating Christ of Scripture is the pou sto upon which all being, knowledge, and ethics are predicated. And since Jesus attests the divine authority and nature of Scripture (Matt. 5:17-19; 22:31; John 10:31-36), it would be irrational, unethical, and unChristian for me to reject my Savior’s perspective on Scripture. I agree with the late Bishop H. C. G. Moule when he writes, “[Christ] absolutely trusted the Bible, and although there are in it things inexplicable and intricate that have puzzled me so much, I am going, not in a blind sense, but reverently to trust the Book because of Him” (cited in John Battersby Harford and Frederick Charles MacDonald, The Life of Bishop Moule [London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1922], 138).
It’s been a pleasure interacting with you. May the Lord guide you into all truth!
Sincerely yours,
Bob Gonzales
Though broader in its scope, Enns’ Inspiration and Incarnation: Evangelicals and the Problem of the Old Testament (Baker Academic, 2005) contains a lengthy chapter entitled, “The Old Testament and Ancient Near Eastern Literature.” One of his aims is to encourage among evangelicals not merely a greater awareness of the interface between OT literature and its ANE counterparts but also deeper reflection upon the doctrinal implications of that interface (p. 13). In fact, he is concerned that the parallels between OT literature and ANE literature (some of which have been known for well over 150 years) “have not been handled well in evangelical theology” (p. 15).
Similarly, Niehaus, in his newly published Ancient Near Eastern Themes in Biblical Theology (Kregel Academic, 2008), affirms his conviction that “there are true and legitimate ways of assessing [the theological and practical] parallels [between the OT and ANE literature] … and of presenting those parallels in a way that will be clear and helpful to others, particularly to students who are fairly new to the subject.” Indeed, Niehaus is convinced that “there is not only a parallelism between certain themes and practices in the Bible and its world, but there is also a structure of thought that is common to them both and that forms the theological backbone of the Bible” (pp. 9-10). So these two OT scholars unite in their concern not only to demonstrate the connections between OT literature and ANE literature but also to highlight the hermeneutical and theological implications of those connections for our understanding of biblical faith and doctrine.
I had read portions of his book (especially those parts dealing with the Genesis narratives), felt very uncomfortable with the directions and implications of his thesis, and expressed my concerns to a seminary student who solicited my opinion (since he knew I had interacted with ancient Near Eastern materials in my dissertation on Genesis). As it turns out, I have since learned that other scholars (D. A. Carson; Gregory Beale; Paul Helms) have felt these same concerns and have written critical reviews of Enns’ book (see below).
