Posted by deangonzales on November 28, 2009
Many Reformed Christians who believe in the validity of infant baptism find it odd that certain Baptist congregations would employ the nomenclature “Reformed Baptist.” Indeed, some Reformed ministers and theologians today are accusing Reformed Baptists of something like “identity theft.” R. Scott Clark, for example, argues in his recently published book Recovering the Reformed Confession that a infant baptism is an essential element of covenant theology, that one cannot have one without the other. So despite the fact that most who call themselves “Reformed Baptist” today affirm a Confession of Faith whose language and theology was drawn largely from the Westminster Confession, we are, in the mind of Clark and others, unwarranted in our employment of the adjective “Reformed.” That ecclesiastical parameters of that adjective were set in ecclesiastical stone by the synods and councils of the 16th and 17th centuries.
Of course, we who call ourselves “Reformed Baptists” might point out the language changes over time–even ecclesiastical language. “Lutheran” was initially used more broadly to refer to all sorts of anti-Romanists. Later, it was narrowed to refer to those who affirm The Augsburg Confession and/or The Formula of Concord. Conversely, it might be argued that the term “Reformed” has changed over time. Just as synods and councils met in the 16th and 17th century, so met an assembly of messengers from various congregations at the end of the 20th century:
The ASSOCIATION OF REFORMED BAPTIST CHURCHES OF AMERICA was founded on March 11, 1997. On that day the first General Assembly met to establish a charter membership of 24 churches from 14 states.
And on that day they ratified an ecclesiastical constitution that identifies their doctrinal standard, which would define them theologically and ecclesiastically:
While we hold tenaciously to the inerrant, infallible and sufficient Word of God as found in the sixty-six books of the Bible (this being our final source of faith and practice), we embrace and adopt the London Baptist Confession of Faith of 1689 as a faithful expression of the doctrine taught in the Scriptures.
So these churches used the 1689 as a means to define themselves as an association of “Reformed Baptist” churches just as Dr. Clark alleges the delegates at Dordtrecht and Westminster Abby did previously.
One of Clark’s responses to this kind of reasoning is to accuse us of what he calls “Reformed Narcissism,” which he illustrates with the following syllogism:
1. I am Reformed
2. I think x
3. Therefore x is Reformed.
“To state the syllogism,” says Clark, “is to expose the silliness of it.” Perhaps stating the syllogism in such an oversimplified way does give it a ring of “silliness.” But if one reflects carefully on Clark’s own reasoning, it doesn’t appear too far removed from the contours of this syllogism:
Dr. Clark’s argument
1. The 16th and 17th century PB Reformers and Puritans said in essence, “We are Reformed.”
2. They said, “We think x [i.e., The Three Forms of Unity/The Westminster Standards]
3. Therefore, x is “Reformed”
If Dr. Clark and company are entitled to that kind of procedure, why not Reformed Baptists?
A Reformed Baptist argument
1. The 20th century Credo-Baptist adherents of the 1689 Confession (granddaughter to the WCF and daughter to the Savoy Declaration) said in essence, “We are not simply Reformed; we are Reformed Baptist.”
2. They said, “We think x [i.e., The Second London Baptist Confession]
3. Therefore, x is “Reformed Baptist.”
Formally, what we did is precisely the same procedure that forms the basis of Clark’s claim to property rights on the singular adjective “Reformed.” We neither claimed “We are reformed” (major premise) nor “Therefore, x is Reformed” (minor premise). Instead, we carefully qualified our language. We are not simply “Reformed,” we are “Reformed Baptist.” In doing so, we made the point that “Reformed” is not enough. “Reformed” by itself may find support in the 3FU or the WS, but it is, in our estimation, sub-biblical. Hence, we chose to identify ourselves (without Dr. Clark’s permission) as something other than simply “Reformed”–we are “Reformed Baptist.”
Does Dr. Clark or his denomination have ecclesiastical authority to overturn what the ARBCA churches have done? Can he take them to court for stealing the adjective “Reformed”? Didn’t the PCUSA force Machen’s group to change it’s name? Why doesn’t Clark do the same if he feels like there’s been a copyright infringement?
Truth of the matter is, Dr. Clark doesn’t believe that the Baptist congregations that formed ARBCA are “true churches.” He expresses his perspective as follows:
We would discipline someone if they left OURC [Oceanside United Reformed Church] and began attending a baptistic congregation or a sect…. I don’t think that any congregation that denies the administration of baptism to covenant children can be a true church. I don’t see how any baptistic congregation is practicing the “pure administration” of the sacraments.
So not only does he insist we not call ourselves “Reformed,” he insists that we stop identifying ourselves as true visible churches of Christ. That leaves us in a very precarious state since, according to one of the Confessions to which Clark subscribes, there is “no ordinary possibility of salvation” outside the visible church (WCF 25.1).
So what do you think? May Baptists use the adjective “Reformed”? Does it really matter? And what do you think about Dr. Clark “de-churching” Baptist congregations? Before answering those questions, you may want to see how these questions are being discussed and debated on the various blog sites below:
R. Scott Clark and “Reformed” by Dr. James White of Alpha and Omega Ministries Apologetics Blog
Follow up on R. Scott Clark and “Reformed” by Dr. James White of Alpha and Omega Ministries Apologetics Blog
Post-Thanksgiving Cartoons: Reply to James White by Dr. R. Scott Clark of The Heidelblog (be sure to read through the comments)
The esse of Reformed: A Current Question by Dr. Michael Haykin of The Andrew Fuller Center of Baptist Studies
Why I Call Myself a Reformed Baptist by Pastor Keith Throop of The Reformed Baptist Blog
James White Blog Concerning Statements of R. Scott Clark on the Puritan Board
Baptist Churches Not True Churches on the Puritan Board
What Does It Mean to Be Reformed on the Puritan Board
Bob Gonzales, Dean
Reformed Baptist Seminary
Posted by deangonzales on November 24, 2009
In Recovering the Reformed Confession: Our Theology, Piety, and Practice, R. Scott Clark argues that modern Reformed churches are in the midst of an identity crisis. Like ships that have lost their moorings in the night and becomes aimlessly adrift at sea, they are without course, without compass, and without captain. It is not Clark’s aim, however, to point out problems without offering solutions. Clark not only details what he sees as the modern Reformed malaise, but also lays out his vision of a Reformed recovery. What he champions is a robust, historical and exhaustive return to confessiononalism. Clark’s position is that the Reformed identity is defined by the historic Confession, and by the manner in which the church and her ministers subscribe to those documents.
The first chapter is introductory, and sets the stage for us by defining the terms of the book as Clark will be using them. In using the term “Reformed,” Clark intends to speak of the theology, piety and practice laid out in the six major confessions of the continental and British churches descendent from John Calvin. In this introduction he also begins to level his charges against modern Reformed folk. The essence of his concern is that the theology, piety and practice of the modern Reformed churches include much that would be alien and even antithetical to the theology, piety and practice of their Reformed forefathers.
The remaining chapters of the book are divided into two parts. Part one, which consists of chapters two and three, details the current crisis of Reformed identity. This section of the book is where Clark presents his evidence to support the accusations leveled in his introduction. This evidence is presented as two illegitimate quests. Like David leering at the bathing Bathsheba, it is argued that these two quests have caught the eye of the Reformed churches and have caused them to turn from the good old paths, running headlong toward folly and mischief.
The first element of the crisis is the Quest for Illegitimate Religious Certainty (QIRC). Clark writes, “QIRC is the pursuit to know God in ways he has not revealed himself and to achieve epistemic and moral certainty on questions where such certainty is neither possible nor desirable” (p. 39). In other words, having failed to maintain a robust, historic confessionalism, Reformed Christianity has been truncated. Reformed folk have sought to fill this vacuum with the QIRC, searching for some new sense of security and identity. Clark gives three examples of this QIRC: the desire to make a literal six day/twenty-four hour understanding of creation a test of Reformed orthodoxy, the desire to claim O.T. theocratic law and regulation as binding in exhaustive detail, and the desire to bring new innovations to our understanding of obedience and justification under the heading of covenant moralism. Clark dismisses each of these desires as either misguided and ill informed (creation debates), or contrary to the confession and dangerous (theonomy and covenant moralism). In each case, it is his view that preoccupation with these issues shows how untethered Reformed folk have become from their confession. Clark believes that the confession settles these matters for us, if we would but return to it as our standard and rule.
Clark titles the second half of the crisis, and his third chapter, the Quest for Illegitimate Religious Experience (QIRE). He now turns his critique to the spirit of revivalism as displayed in the Great Awakening and especially as personified by Jonathan Edwards and his modern celebrators. To Clark, revival in any form is incompatible with reformation. Revival seeks the immediate and extraordinary movement of God in the hearts of men, often divorced from the church and her ordinances, and as such is hopelessly infected with pietism. Reformation, conversely, makes due use of ordinary means as prescribed in Scripture and administered weekly in the church, and in these things finds satisfaction and rest.
To Clark, a high view of revival (and the direct, relational communion with God it entails) necessitates a low view of the church (especially of her confession, and of God’s appointed means of grace). This dichotomy runs throughout the book, and is evident in comments like the one found on page 330: “perhaps attendance to the second [worship] service is actually a better indicator of spiritual maturity than are the calluses on our knees and the wear on our Bibles.” Some of Clark’s views will be interacted with critically below, but a word must be said at this point. Clark’s dichotomy between reformation and revival (and thus between the means of grace and private piety) is indicative of the major flaw in his analysis. Why must attendance to the second worship service be set against private prayer and Bible reading? Why must a high view of the means of grace necessitate a low view of private piety? God’s Word, which has the final say in such matters, has a high view of both.
Having diagnosed the crisis, Clark spends the rest of his pages detailing what a healthy recovery should look like. The remaining five chapters form Part Two of the book, titled “The Recovery.” Chapters four and five are essentially a plea for honesty about what the confession says, what the confession means, and what the confession mandates for us in theology, piety, and practice. Chapter six caps this discussion by highlighting the benefits and joys of a robust and full submission to the Reformed confession. The last two chapters of the book offer a very detailed survey of the exegesis, history, and confessional tradition associated with the Lord’s Day and Christian worship. Clark’s vision for rejuvenated Reformed worship revolves around a strict adherence to the Regulative Principle of Worship, a central view of the means of grace, and the reinstitution of a second Lord’s Day worship service.
It is clear that R. Scott Clark is a man of considerable academic ability who has a deep passion for the health and faithfulness of the church. He brings thorough research and a keen mind to nearly all of the topics with which he interacts. There is much value in working through his arguments and considering his conclusions. This does not mean, however, that his conclusions should be agreed with or supported. In fact, he reaches many conclusions that are profoundly misguided and some even dangerous to the theology, piety, and practice of the church.
Before those concerns are addressed, the book’s positive contributions should be acknowledged. Clark effectively calls evangelicals searching for religion with greater substance to take up the banner of being Reformed. His invitation to resist Rome, Constantinople, and the Emergent Village in favor of Geneva is timely and stirring. Reformed folk must strive for the sort of visibility and credibility that will make this a viable option for disillusioned evangelicals.
Clark is correct, as well, when he argues for the inevitability and general benefits of being confessional. Under his relentless logic, the maxim “no creed but Scripture” is exposed as a fallacy. Furthermore, this book contains considerable amounts of very sound and helpful exegetical and historical research. Of special note is the logical and convincing exegesis of John 4:23-24, and the excellent survey of the Christian Sabbath from Biblical, confessional, and historical perspectives.
However, as previously noted, these positive elements are found in the midst of some troubling material. There are issues that Clark deals with which deserve a response beyond the scope of this review. Many of these issues, such as his extreme application of the Regulative Principle of Worship and his strict dichotomy between objective and subjective religious experiences are urgent in that they bear directly on church practice. In addition to the criticism of his views on the QIRE offered above, only one area of concern will be highlighted here for criticism.
Even as he criticizes the QIRC and the QIRE, there is a quest which Clark himself undertakes in Recovering the Reformed Confession. We can call this the Quest for Illegitimate Religious Traditionalism (QIRT). The QIRT is the desire to settle all questions of theology, piety and practice by total submission to the historic Reformed confession, as interpreted by the animus imponentis. This is an illegitimate quest and ought not be pursued for three reasons.
First, it is an illegitimate quest because it muddles the theological method. Confessions, like any work that systematizes the truths of Scripture, are always to be derived from sound exegesis. It is exegesis, with subordinate input from historical theology, which must always be the foundation of the church’s theology.
Unfortunately, this does not seem to be the operative method for R. Scott Clark. It seems that for Clark, the confession is authoritative. It is the confession, interpreted by history, which drives exegesis. The reader begins to get a flavor of this muddled method when Clark remarks, “Not every appeal to Scripture is Reformed or reforming. Any appeal to Scripture that fundamentally overturns what it is to be Reformed cannot itself be a Reformed appeal to Scripture” (p. 25). If this were the only such statement in the book, it might be forgiven as slightly misguided zeal for one’s heritage, but this is not an isolated sentiment.
A more direct example of this muddled method occurs when Clark sets out to build exegetical evidence for his strict interpretation of the Regulative Principle of Worship. Clark argues that the Regulative Principle requires instruments and uninspired songs to be abandoned; while at the same time he insists on a mandatory second worship service. On pages 337-338, he surveys texts from Genesis, Exodus, Ezra, 1 Chronicles, and the Psalms as they relate to these issues. His reading of these texts is clearly shaped and submitted to confessional and historical concerns. He is able in just a few sentences to dismiss any exegetical content that does not support his agenda as merely typological, while insisting that any exegetical material that does support his agenda has abiding validity. The following passage is typical: “Psalm 141:2 is attributed to King David, and he speaks of ‘lifting up’ his hands ‘as the evening sacrifice.’ Of course, these passages were given during the church’s typological period so they apply to us only figuratively. Christ is our sacrifice, our priest, and our temple. Nevertheless, they do give evidence that the ‘morning and evening’ pattern of creation has some continuing place in our re-creation” (pp. 337-338). In other words, any material from the Old Testament that does not support the agenda (clear use of instruments, composing new songs) is typological and any material that does support the agenda (morning and evening pattern of worship) establishes a compelling pattern. Clark’s exegesis is the servant of his systematic and historical theology, thus confusing the proper theological method.
Second, this QIRT is illegitimate because Clark crosses the line into a dangerous confessionalism. “Dangerous” is a strong word, but it is appropriate when the living Word of God is made to share its throne as our supreme authority with a man-made document. “Is not my word like a fire?” says the LORD, “and like a hammer that breaks the rock in pieces?” Confessions are valuable, and they may even be precious to us. But they are not like fire. They are not a discerner of the heart. They are not God-breathed.
The opponents of the use of a confession of faith usually accuse its proponents of confessionalism, which is the tendency to give a confession of faith equal or higher authority than the Scriptures. This is generally a false charge, but in the case of R. Scott Clark, it seems sadly appropriate.
The reader begins to get uncomfortable early on, when Clark remarks that “…sola scriptura [does] not teach that the Bible means what one says it does, but that the Scriptures, being God’s Word, form the church, and the church in subjection to the Scriptures is able to interpret them well enough to decide controversies”(pp. 25-6). While Clark’s zeal for ecclesiastical authority may make some uncomfortable, this passage could be taken as nothing more than a proper condemnation of the widespread distortion of sola scriptura into solo scriptura. If Clark simply set out to critique the “Tradition 0” zeitgeist, and to build a better understanding of “Tradition I,” there would no reason for alarm. Although this healthy return to Tradition 1 is Clark’s stated goal, he seems to have overshot that mark. A statement such as the one made brazenly and with only weak qualification on page 178, that “the authority of the confession is…tantamount to that of Scripture, assuming that a given confession is biblical,” leaves no doubt as to whether R. Scott Clark has crossed a line that ought not to be crossed.
This quote is taken from the context of Clark’s interaction with the writings of R. B. Kuiper. Writing in 1926, Kuiper objected to the practice of the ecclesiastical courts in appealing to the confession as authoritative, without feeling the need to check the confession against Scripture. It was Kuiper’s concern that this practice might give the impression that the church had adopted a dangerous confessionalism, wherein the confession was nearly “tantamount” to Scripture. Clark’s reply, by way of the animus imponentis, is that the confession is indeed tantamount to Scripture in authority.
Clark can make this assertion with a straight face (one assumes) because he qualifies it by saying that the confession must, of course, be Biblical (quia subscription). Even ignoring the monstrous problem of getting any two Christians to agree that a given confession is utterly Biblical in the sort of exhaustive detail required to make such a view tenable, equating the authority of the confession with that of the Bible evidences a profound misunderstanding of why the Bible is authoritative. The Bible is not authoritative simply because it is true and accurate in the sort of strict forensic way that can be reproduced in a confession, but because it is the living Word of God Almighty. The Word’s authority is derived from its God breathed, self-attesting character. A man can and should faithfully confess the truths he learns from God’s Word, but he cannot replicate its authority. The authority of the confession is authoritative only in so far (quatenus subscription) as it states what can be clearly shown in the Scriptures. Thus, even if it is completely Biblical, the authority of the confession is never tantamount to that of God’s Word. The cleanest mirror in all the world is still just a reflection; it is never on equal footing with reality.
Third, the QIRT is illegitimate because it simply cannot be consistently maintained. Clark paints a romantic picture of quia subscription and heady conformity to the animus imponentis which simply does not match reality. Consistency cannot even be maintained within the pages of Recovering the Reformed Confession. On page 318 he addresses the diversity in how the Reformed churches have understood the Sabbath. If there is diversity on an issue as central to our theology, piety, and practice as the Sabbath, can we really speak of the Reformed Confession in the singular tense? Exactly which understanding of the Sabbath is to be recovered? Clark is aware of this inconsistency and seeks to alleviate it by appealing to the substantive agreement on the main points of the Sabbath in the Reformed confession. This is a fine tactic for one holding to quatenus subscription, but Clark has already overplayed his hand at this point.
Clark has painted himself into a corner by way of his own strident confessionalism. It is not consistent to state that “…the Scriptures, being God’s Word, form the church, and the church in subjection to the Scriptures is able to interpret them well enough to decide controversies” (p. 26), yet on page 270 suggest that the disagreements between the a capella Psalter crowd and the more mainstream Reformed worshipers be settled by a compromise. Again, this may be a fine and equatable way for a church to settle a dispute, but why does Clark get to break his own rules at this point?
These three concerns make up the Quest for Illegitimate Religious Traditionalism. Clark’s zeal in these matters is beyond question, and his earnest pursuit of what he believes would be a more healthy and faithful Church is admirable. However, his muddled theological approach, his dangerous confessionalism, and his inconsistency expose this quest as illegitimate. It should be repeated again that this quest is not isolated. Clark pushes too far in several directions, though none of them as directly inappropriate as in this QIRT. Even with these major concerns, this is a book which ought to be read by any who attach the adjective Reformed to their denominational identity. Iron sharpens iron, and R. Scott Clark has issued a challenge to seriously consider the foundations of our theology, piety and practice. May all God’s people be sharper for it, and may they faithfully confess the gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ until He gathers them home.
Nicolas Alford, Student
Reformed Baptist Seminary
